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INTRODUCTION 
How does one embrace the riches of the knowledge presented in this 
Conference?  This Conference’s participants have presented the fiduciary 
relationship from so many points of view: interdisciplinary perspectives, 
current issues, and particular fascinating narrower topics.  Does this event 
suggest that critics are correct, and that fiduciary law as a category is 
incoherent?1  Arguably, fiduciary relationships and the rules that govern them 
 
∗ Professor of Law, Michaels Faculty Scholar, Boston University School of Law. 
1 With regard to “thought and mental phenomena,” the Oxford English Dictionary 
defines “incoherent” as “without logical connection or natural sequence of ideas; 
inconsistent, rambling, disjointed.”  7 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 804 (2d ed. 1989).  In 
the physics of waves, the term means having “no definite or stable phase relationship.”  Id.  
In contrast, I assert that one can view fiduciary law as both comprehensible and as clear as 
any other recognized area of the law. 
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are too varied.  Yet I maintain that the variety presented in this Conference 
leads to the opposite conclusion, and that the papers in this Conference provide 
support for my claim: that fiduciary law should be viewed and understood as 
one legal category.  
In this closing Essay I defend the recognition of fiduciary law as a crucial 
and powerful branch of the law.  Viewing this area of the law as a whole, one 
discovers a structure.2  Its variable rules are linked to, and can be explained by, 
a few distinct conditions.  In fact, this area of the law has existed for centuries 
because it is open ended.  It has not shriveled and died because it is anchored 
in few important conditions.  Fiduciary law can accommodate new situations 
and changes in social morals and norms, yet maintain its core values and 
norms, without which no society can survive, let alone flourish.3  Its definitions 
of duties may adjust to the magnitude of the problems fiduciary relationships 
pose when social mores change.4  It highlights the “difficulties that face a legal 
ethic of service to others . . . in a culture that celebrates personal wealth, 
achievement and consumption.”5  Yet the imposition of fiduciary duties 
continues.  In fact, the argument is not about whether such fiduciary 
relationships and the resultant duties exist, but about how, and under what 
legal system, these relationships and duties should be enforced.6   
 
2 See Rafael Chodos, Fiduciary Law: Why Now?  Amending the Law School Curriculum, 
91 B.U. L. REV. 837 (2011), for the suggestion that law schools should offer a separate 
course in fiduciary law. 
3 See, for example, Arthur B. Laby, SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau and the 
Investment Advisors Act of 1940, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1051 (2011), for a discussion of the 
common law source of fiduciary rules in federal fiduciary law and the confusion that the 
common law application has imposed.  This confusing development, however, will result in 
the application of fiduciary law principles to broker dealers through the Investment Advisers 
Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21 (2006), which prohibits advisers from 
defrauding clients or prospective clients.  Laby, supra, at 1052-54.  See David J. Seipp, 
Trust and Fiduciary Duty in the Early Common Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1011 (2011), for a 
discussion of the role of fiduciary common law in England in the Twelfth through Sixteenth 
Centuries. 
4 See, e.g., Frederick Tung, The Puzzle of Independent Directors, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1175, 
1175-77 (2011) (discussing varying attitudes toward independent directors); Charles K. 
Whitehead, Why Not a CEO Term Limit?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1263, 1269-71 (2011) 
(examining increasing federal regulation of directors and CEOs and decreasing deference to 
managing boards).  For issues concerning executive pay, see David I. Walker, Executive 
Pay Lessons from Private Equity, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1209 (2011), comparing executive pay in 
publicly held and private equity corporations and concluding that the differences between 
the two CEO pay-stubs are “consistent with differences in capital structure, monitoring, and 
other intrinsic differences in the two organizational forms.”  Id. at 1221. 
5 Donald C. Langevoort, Psychological Perspectives on the Fiduciary Business, 91 B.U. 
L. REV. 995, 995 (2011). 
6 See Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of 
Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (2011) (presenting various standards under which 
fiduciary relationships are enforced). 
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Fiduciary law regulates relationships that are based on reasonable trust.  
Trust is crucial in any society.7  Few relationships can exist or survive without 
some degree of trust.  Trusting can be defined as “believing that others tell the 
truth and will keep their promises.”8   
With few exceptions, trust is essential to economic prosperity.  Thousands 
of people contribute to the sustenance and comfort of each of us, our 
dress and lodging, transportation and communications, education and 
entertainment.  If we could not rely on the wholesomeness of the food we 
buy, the expertise of our physicians and lawyers, the honesty of our banks 
and mutual funds, or, as Sweeney Todd noted, the trustworthiness of the 
barber with his sharp shaving razor, our lives would be far more 
primitive. . . .  Trust saves time and money.  It allows people to believe 
other persons’ statements without checking their truth, and to rely on 
other persons’ promises, without demanding guarantees.  It allows people 
to use the talents of strangers.9   
However, trusting, like any human relationship, becomes “as complicated as 
humans and their society.”10 
The benefits of trusting are accompanied by the risks of abuse of trust and 
the costs of self-protection from such abuse.  Therefore, trust is rarely 
complete.  Infants must trust without reservation.11  But as people grow up, 
they trust a bit and verify a bit.  “When the cost of verifying the truth and 
honesty of the other party is negligible, and the potential losses from the 
transaction are relatively low, there is no need to trust.”12  But when the cost of 
verifying are very high, people refrain from interacting, even in relationships 
that are beneficial to them and society.  
 
7 See James E. Post, Governance, Accountability, and Trust: A Comment on the Work of 
Tamar Frankel, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2011). 
8 TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A 
CROSSROAD 49 (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leonard I. Rotman, 
Fiduciary Law’s “Holy Grail”: Reconciling Theory and Practice in Fiduciary 
Jurisprudence, 91 B.U. L. REV. 921, 937-945 (2011) (reviewing judicial and academic 
attempts to define fiduciary law).  For a critical and detailed discussion of trust that does not 
view trusting and verifying as contradictory, see Richard Holton, Fiduciary Relations and 
the Nature of Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 991, 991-92 (2011). 
9 FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 49.  For an analysis of fiduciary relationships in the context 
of the recent economic downturn, see Cheryl L. Wade, Fiduciary Duty and the Public 
Interest, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1191 (2011).  For a discussion of the psychological aspects of the 
security industry, see Langevoort, supra note 5, at 998-99. 
10 FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 49. 
11 See Margaret F. Brinig, Parents: Trusted but not Trustees or (Foster) Parents as 
Fiduciaries, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1231, 1234 (2011) (discussing trust within family and 
community relationships). 
12 FRANKEL, supra note 8, at 52. 
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Fiduciary law is aimed at allowing people to use the talents of strangers and 
reduce their cost of verification.  The cost of self-protection can be driven not 
only by the cost in dollars and cents but also, as Ramon Casadesus-Masanell 
and Daniel F. Spulber suggest, by “social norms, legal duties, and market 
standards.”13  Thus, this cost of verifying trustworthiness is measured by the 
ability of the other party to self-protect, by the desirability of reliance when the 
other party is unable to self-protect, and by the society’s benefit from his or her 
protection.  
How does the law distinguish between the different fiduciary relationships?  
All fiduciary relationships involve two main components that provide benefits 
to the parties and to society.14  Yet, these benefits pose two serious problems as 
well.15  The differences between all fiduciary relationships derive from the 
different degrees of these problems.  
The starting point of fiduciary law is the definition of these problems, and 
its aim is to solve or ameliorate them.16  The focus and strictness of fiduciary 
rules reflect the severity that these problems pose both to the entrustors and to 
society.  Social norms are the leading norms that guide these rules. 
Below, I outline the structure of fiduciary relationships and the law that 
governs them as follows: first, I list the benefits that fiduciary relationships 
bestow on the parties and on society, and the problems that these relationships 
pose.  Second, I link the different types of fiduciary relationships, and the 
problems they pose, to the rules that govern them.  Stricter rules apply to 
fiduciary relationships that pose the most risk to entrustors.  The risk, however, 
is not measured only by the magnitude and expertise of the fiduciary, but also 
by the ability of the entrustor to protect himself and any other controls over the 
fiduciary’s performance of his services.  
This Conference demonstrates the coherence and the riches of fiduciary law.  
While all laws reflect the society’s changing environment, values, and norms, 
fiduciary law reflects them with great clarity.  The Conference papers help to 
predict the possible expanding application of fiduciary law to new situations as 
well as its reduced interference in other relationships. 
 
13 Ramon Casadesus-Masanell & Daniel F. Spulber, Trust and Incentives in Agency, 15 
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 45, 47 (2005).  Economists note that fiduciary relationships have 
existed for 250 years, yet have not achieved a precise definition.  Id. at 48.  Some scholars 
question whether fiduciary relationships “should be part of the legal definition.  
Organization theorists view legal duties themselves as ineffective or even as destroying 
trust.  This sociological approach tends to emphasize the social context to the exclusion of 
legal rules and contract incentives.”  Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).  
14 See infra Part I.A. 
15 See infra Parts I.B. and I.C. 
16 See Seipp, supra note 3, at 1011-12 (defining fiduciary duties generally and describing 
the evolution of the fiduciary system throughout the common law). 
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I. THE NATURE AND COMPONENTS OF FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS AND THE 
RISKS THE RELATIONSHIPS POSE TO BOTH PARTIES 
A. Components of Fiduciary Relationships 
First, fiduciaries offer services that are socially important.  They are 
generally costly to acquire, drawing on significant ability and investment of 
time and money.17  Therefore, it is in the interest of society that non-experts 
use fiduciaries’ services and avoid wasteful duplication of these services.  For 
example, it makes no sense for every investor to become an expert in finance, 
real estate, or other types of investments.  It makes no sense for every person to 
become a medical doctor, a lawyer, or the manager of a large enterprise.  It is 
desirable for investors, patients, and clients to rely on people who command 
the expertise. 
Second, fiduciary relationships involve a crucial component of entrustment.  
I name the parties to fiduciary relationships “entrustors.”18  Fiduciaries cannot 
perform their services unless they are entrusted with property or power.  No 
money manager can effectively manage clients’ money unless he has some 
control over it.  No doctor can operate on a patient without acquiring full 
control of the patient’s body.  No adviser or lawyer can provide advice without 
exercising discretion.  Experts have the power of greater information and 
understanding as compared to the client.  These entrustors may be principals in 
an agency relationship, clients to lawyers, patients of doctors, beneficiaries of 
trusts managed by trustees, and investors whose money is managed by 
investment advisers.  There are also cases in which individual entrustors are 
hard to specify except to note that they are the public, as in the case of a 
charitable organization.19  
B. While Fiduciaries’ Services Provide Benefits to Entrustors, the Services 
Involve Risks as Well  
Entrustment of property poses for entrustors the risk that the fiduciaries will 
misuse the entrusted property.  Property and power are entrusted to fiduciaries 
for the sole purpose of facilitating the fiduciaries’ services to entrustors.  None 
of the property or power is entrusted for the benefit of the fiduciaries for any 
other use.  Yet, fiduciaries may be tempted to violate their duties.  
Therefore, entrustment poses for entrustors the risk that fiduciaries will use 
the entrusted property and power for purposes other than in the service of the 
entrustors.  In addition, entrustment poses for entrustors the risk that the 
fiduciaries will not possess the expertise they purport to posses, or, even if they 
do, that the fiduciaries will not exercise their expertise well, or fail to exercise 
 
17 See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 6-7 (2011). 
18 Id. at 7-8. 
19 Alan L. Feld, Who Are the Beneficiaries of Fisk University’s Stieglitz Collection?, 91 
B.U. L. REV. 873, 873-74 (2011).  
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their expertise at all.  These risks are serious, and the harm they might cause 
can be significant; they are very difficult to uncover and prevent. 
C. Fiduciary Relationships Pose Risks to Fiduciaries as Well  
To some extent, the fiduciaries’ risks are similar to the risks of any person 
who offers services for pay or sells products for a price.  These risks involve 
competition among fiduciaries that offer the same or similar services and 
entrustors that might not have sufficient trust in the fiduciaries’ honesty and 
capabilities.  Fiduciaries must convince entrustors that their entrusted property 
and power are used for the entrustors’ sole benefit.  That may be costly to do. 
D. Fiduciary Relationships Involve Combined Entrustment and Entitlement 
for the Fiduciaries  
First, fiduciaries are entitled to compensation for their services.  After all, 
they must make a living.  Therefore, part of the assets entrusted to the 
fiduciaries may be deemed, rightfully or mistakenly, to be payment to which 
the fiduciaries are entitled.  
Second, people may combine their assets, abilities, or expertise to establish 
or acquire a business.  They can divide among themselves the authority to 
represent the business.  This representation constitutes the fiduciary 
relationship of agency. The relationship vests in the representatives the power 
to bind both the business as a whole and each of the partners.  Yet, part of the 
business belongs to the representing agents, and part belongs to others, to 
which the agents are fiduciaries.  Therefore, in such cases the fiduciaries are 
part-owners and part-fiduciaries.  Each bears a risk that the other party will 
misappropriate not only what is its own but also what belongs to the others.  In 
the case of a joint business, the risk is that a partner may misappropriate the 
power to act for the entire partnership.  
Third, long-term fiduciary relationships may expose the parties to the risks 
that their counterparties may change, the business in which they are involved 
may change, and the environment in which the fiduciaries function may 
change.  Therefore, the assumptions that entrustors and fiduciaries make when 
they enter the relationships may no longer hold true, and breed disagreements.  
Disagreements can provide justifications for abuse of entrustment.   
Fourth, evidence of misappropriation and poor performance of expert 
services may emerge many years after the fiduciary services were rendered.  
For example, evidence of a poorly drafted will can appear after the client died.  
Evidence of a patient’s maltreatment is not necessarily easily identified.  
Evidence of entrusted property misappropriation can take years to uncover, 
especially, for example, in Ponzi schemes, as con artist fiduciaries always pay 
immediately on demand with money from another victim until they cease 
payment altogether. 
Fifth, some fiduciary duties can be waived by entrustors.  Waivers provide a 
fertile ground for later disagreements.  Some waivers cover the very nature of 
the relationship and raise a question of whether the parties should be allowed 
  
2011] FIDUCIARY LAW IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 1295 
 
to determine the legal status and consequences of their relationship.  Some 
waivers raise the question of whether the entrustors gave the waivers both 
freely and with understanding of the consequences.  Did the waiving entrustors 
know, and could they have known, all the facts that would lead to a waiver, 
even if they were capable of making it?  Waivers may suggest that contract law 
rather than fiduciary law would apply to the relationships.  The difference 
between the two branches of law is important when remedies are considered.  
While a breach of contract entitles the harmed party mainly to damages, a 
breach of fiduciary relationship entitles the damaged entrustor to punitive 
damages, sometimes in the absence of any injury.  After all, abuse of 
entrustment constitutes stealing and misappropriation without the consent of 
the owner.  Thus, gray areas require the separation of entrusted property and 
power, subject to fiduciary law, from payments and power given to the 
fiduciaries for their own use.  
II. HOW ARE THE ENTRUSTORS’ RISKS FROM FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIPS 
REDUCED OR ELIMINATED? 
A number of possible mechanisms have been used to reduce the entrustors’ 
risks from the fiduciary relationship. 
A. Entrustors’ Verification and Self-Help  
Depending on their expertise, entrustors can attempt to identify the risks 
posed by fiduciaries, verify in advance the possible risks, and remove some of 
the risks.  For example, an entrustor who is an expert, devoted education and 
time to the entrustment process, or examined the fiduciaries’ particular services 
may ask the fiduciary questions or glean information.  This process might help 
the entrustor choose a trustworthy expert and reduce the probability of risk 
from abuse of entrustment and lack of expertise. 
Risk-reduction by verification involves the cost of time and money 
concerning the inquiry.  Verifying the quality of the fiduciaries’ services 
requires duplicating the fiduciaries’ investments in their expertise.  Verifying 
abuse of entrusted property is even more costly.  Not only does the entrustor 
have to be an expert, but, in addition, he must collect the information the 
fiduciary possessed as well as information about the activities in which the 
fiduciary has engaged.  Hiring an expert to verify the reliability and the risk of 
another fiduciary’s service is not only costly but raises the same issues raised 
by the employment of fiduciaries themselves.  After all, the expert is a 
fiduciary as well.  The risk of one expert evaluating another may be just as 
serious.  And regardless of costs, inquiry reduces the probability of abuse, but 
does not eliminate the risk.  Consulting an expert may verify past trustworthy 
behavior and expertise but does not ensure a fiduciary’s future behavior. 
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B. Specifying the Fiduciary’s Services and Performance Often Does Not 
Reduce Risk  
Entrustors may instruct the fiduciary on how to perform the services and 
thereby control the risk of abuse.  However, many of the fiduciary’s services 
depend on changing environments or other unanticipated events.  Entrustors 
can tell some fiduciaries, such as brokers, who are agents, to achieve a certain 
goal (sell or buy products), but cannot tell the fiduciaries how to negotiate with 
another party or how to determine the quality of the goods to be bought.  
Rather, the fiduciaries in these situations must use their expertise for making 
these decisions depending on the circumstances.  Thus, specifying the manner 
in which the fiduciary services are to be performed is often ineffective. 
C. Controlling Fiduciaries’ Performance by Demanding Guarantees Is 
Costly to Fiduciaries  
Entrustors may attempt to reduce the risks from fiduciaries’ abuse by 
demanding guarantees.  However, guarantees increase the fiduciaries’ costs.  
Entrustors may organize and demand supervision or other mechanisms of 
ensuring prevention of abuse.  However, organization also involves costs.  
Supervision without intervention may not be effective; intervention may result 
in costly reduction of expert performance. 
D. Imposing Contractual Remedies on Fiduciaries  
The parties may impose contractual penalties on fiduciaries.  A movement 
in academia and some courts, during the past thirty years, has sought to limit 
the applicability of fiduciary law and encourage entrustors’ self-defense by 
contract.20  Only a few extremists deny the need for fiduciary law and express 
a devout belief in the “market” – whatever that means.21  This approach, 
however, may not effectively prevent abuse of entrustment.  First, misuse of 
entrusted property may not necessarily harm the entrustor.  A trustee who sells 
trust property for a market price, or even higher than the market price, does not 
damage the entrustors.  However, such a sale is, in effect, misappropriating 
someone else’s property without permission.  Perhaps the entrustor does not 
wish to sell the property because it is his parents’ home and has a sentimental 
value for him.  Perhaps he does not wish to sell the house at the current market 
price, and is waiting for the price to rise.  A practice of violating the duty to 
avoid conflicts of interest can become a habit.22  While the first transaction 
may not result in monetary loss for entrustors, the second and third and fourth 
 
20 See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 903-04 
(2011). 
21 See Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 527 F.3d 627, 632 (7th Cir. 2008), vacated, 130 S.Ct. 
1418, 1431 (2010). 
22 See Joshua Getzler, “As if.”  Accountability and Counterfactual Trust, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
973, 973-74 (2011). 
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transactions might.  Thus, the penalties for dealing with and having control of 
other people’s property requires a higher degree of deterrence – such as 
punitive damages, accounting for the fiduciary’s profits, and injunction.  
III. MEASURING THE LAW’S INTERVENTION BY COST  
A number of reasons may justify strict fiduciary rules imposed on the 
different species of fiduciaries.  These reasons are apparent in the rules that are 
actually imposed on different fiduciaries.  
First, the higher the risk of fiduciaries’ abuse, the lower the ability and cost 
of controlling and limiting the fiduciaries’ entrusted property and power, and 
the stricter the rules and remedies would be.  In contrast, the lower the 
entrustment and the risk of fiduciaries’ abuse, the less strict the rules and 
remedies should be.  For example, trust law imposes strict duties on trustees.  
In the trust arrangement the trustees have significant power.  The beneficiaries 
cannot direct the trustees nor remove them without judicial proceedings.  In 
contrast, a principal can direct an agent in the performance of his duties and 
terminate the agency even in violation of a contract.  Consequently, trust law 
imposes on trustees far stricter rules than agency law imposes on agents.23  
Second, the larger the number of entrustors, regardless of how extensive 
each entrustment is, the stricter the rules and remedies for violations should be.  
The lower the number of entrustors, the more relaxed the rules and remedies 
should be.  There are two reasons for this observation.  As the amounts of 
entrustment – whether from the few or the many – increases, so does the risk.  
The assumption is that the higher the entrusted amounts and the greater the 
entrusted power, the greater the temptation to misappropriate and abuse may 
become.  In addition, the smaller the entrustment by each individual, the higher 
the costs for each individual to monitor and attempt to control a fiduciary’s 
abuse.  In such a case “exit” is far more rational than “voice,” trying to remove 
management.24   
Third, the stricter the controls (without undermining the utility of the 
service) over the fiduciaries’ exercise of power, the more relaxed the rules over 
fiduciaries should be.  In these cases, the burden of self-protection rises and we 
assume that the controls will reduce the risk to entrustors.  Conversely, the 
lower the entrustors’ controls over the fiduciaries’ exercise of power, the 
stricter the rules and remedies should be. 
Fourth, the higher the costs of verifying the trustworthiness of the 
fiduciaries, the stricter the rules and remedies should be.  The lower the costs 
of verifying the trustworthiness of the fiduciaries, the more relaxed the rules 
and remedies should be.  In this case as well, we assume that as the costs of 
verification rise, entrustors will engage in less verification.  Unless other 
 
23 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 
1039, 1045 (2011). 
24 FRANKEL, supra note 17, at 33. 
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controls that reduce the entrustors’ risks are in place, the law imposes stricter 
rules to prevent abuse. 
IV. CALIBRATING THE LAW BY THE MEASURE OF TEMPTATIONS  
Fiduciary law reflects the degree of temptation to which fiduciaries are 
exposed.25  The larger the entrusted amounts, the greater the fiduciaries’ 
temptation may become.  The smaller the amounts, the lower the temptation.  
The amounts fiduciaries receive demonstrates a second, related effect.  
Arguably, the higher the amounts they receive, the lower their temptation to 
abuse.  But that conclusion is incomplete.  When the earned amounts are linked 
to evaluation of prestige and signs of power, the amounts fiduciaries need and 
justify are linked to the amounts that others in more or less the same position 
receive.  Temptation for fiduciaries to equalize or even increase the amounts 
due by abuse rather than straight-forward means grows, and with it 
justification for such abuse. 
Another temptation arises with the justification of fiduciaries’ behavior by 
others, such as academics.  This justification is linked to the evaluation of the 
fiduciaries’ contributions to entrustors.  The more money managers earn for 
entrustors, the more they feel justified in sharing entrusted money and 
appropriating it for themselves.  Academics have propagated this equation by 
reasoning that sharing with investors would increase the managers’ incentives 
to produce, thus benefiting investors and other entrustors.  However, the 
identity of fiduciaries with entrustors does not always produce the expected 
results.  
First, fiduciaries are led to identify with the status of entrustors-owners – an 
invitation to abuse trust.  Second, when fiduciaries are unsuccessful in 
production for the shareholders, some management members resort to 
“cooking the books,” imposing enormous pressure on the staff to produce, no 
matter how, and making misleading disclosures to investors.  It is unclear 
whether the identity of managers’ incentives and investors’ lead to these 
results.  Causation is hard to prove generally, and impossible to prove in this 
case.  But, giving fiduciaries incentives to identify with their entrustors, 
without constraints, may be dangerous.  Fiduciaries are not, and should not 
view themselves as, the owners of entrusted property. 
Temptations abound when fiduciaries service a large group of entrustors and 
are entrusted with large amounts of money.  These fiduciaries can attract 
vendors bearing gifts.  The Chief Executive Officer of a corporation that 
employs thousands of people and controls billions of dollars is treated very 
 
25 See Deborah A. DeMott, Causation in the Fiduciary Realm, 91 B.U. L. REV. 851, 871 
(2011) (“Causation in the fiduciary realm is far from a narrative of brute sequence, whether 
the beneficiary seeks disgorgement of ill-gotten gains from a disloyal fiduciary or seeks 
compensation for harm inflicted by the disloyalty.  In both instances, standards to assess 
causal connections should reflect the underlying objective of imposing liability for fiduciary 
disloyalty.”). 
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differently from entrustors who contribute small amounts to corporate wealth.  
The banks, the lawyer, the accountant, and other vendors, who seek to sell their 
goods and services to the “corporation,” do not aim at convincing the money 
contributors.  Rather they aim at influencing the decision of the Chief 
Executive Officer, and gaining his good graces.  It is not surprising that 
powerful fiduciaries cease to view their powers as entrusted.  In fact, when 
abuse of fiduciary power is rampant, one might expect proposals to justify 
separation of ownership from control and allocation to controlling persons a 
greater portion of power ownership.  
Fiduciary law can be a useful model in various contexts.  For example, 
David Ponet and Ethan Leib suggest that “features of fiduciary law usefully 
model how deliberation can be understood between political unequals, in 
particular when the individual with more political power is supposed to be 
holding the interests of the individual with less power in trust.”26  
The breadth of fiduciary law defies resorting to the meaning of the words.  
The meaning of fiduciary rules must be linked to the nature of the problem 
which the rules are designed to reduce or resolve.  A dictionary definition of 
the rules can undermine the purpose of fiduciary law and result in enormous 
harm to society.  
CONCLUSION 
These Conference papers offer a kaleidoscope of views on fiduciary 
relationships in many situations and the law that should govern them.  The 
papers deal with different fiduciary rules and various evaluations of the 
problem that fiduciary law is designed to resolve.  They address these rules and 
issues from different disciplines and points of view.  Yet, they all focus on the 
same problem, and all these varied scenes highlight a pattern, which we can 
generalize and on which we can then draw.   
 
26 David L. Ponet & Ethan J. Leib, Fiduciary Law’s Lessons for Deliberative 
Democracy, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1249, 1249-50 (2011). 
